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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW
LIABILITY WITHOUT FAuLT.-In Ives v. South Buffalo Ry. Co., 2ox N. Y.271, appeared, as a basis for the decision, the statement that "When ourConstitutions were adopted, it was the law of the land that no man who was
without fault or negligence could be held liable in damages for injuries
sustained by another. That is still the law." Mr. Justice McKenna has re-
cently voiced the same idea. In his dissenting opinion in Arizona Copper
Co. v. Hammer, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 553, he contends that the Workmen's Com-pensation Act of Arizona is unconstitutional, because, "It seems to me to be
of the very foundation of right-of the essence of liberty as it is of morals-
to be free from liability if one is free from fault." Even the majority of the
court seemed inclined to justify their decision, that the Act was constitutional,by the argument that, as the liability under it would be known in advance,
employers could protect themselves by "reducing wages and increasing the
se!ling price of the product, in order to allow for the statutory liability."
The fallacy of this proposition, as a principle of the Common Law, hasbeen several times pointed out. One type of case, however, in which liabil-ity without fault not only exists, but is constantly being enlarged, seems tohave been ignored. By the Common Law there is imposed upon sellers ofgoods, in certain instances, a liability of which they are not notified and
which has no relation whatever to fault or free will on their part.
These are the cases in which sellers of goods are held to be' absolute in-
surers of the harmlessness thereof. In Parks v. Yost Pie Co., 93 Kan. 334,for instance, the plaintiff had been poisoned by some deleterious substance in
a pie which he had bought from a retail dealer. There was no vrivity of
contract with the defendant, but the latter, as a manufacturer, had made thepie and sold it to the intermediate dealer. The action for damages was intort. There was absolutely no evidence of fault on the defendant's part
even offered, beyond the facts stated. Nevertheless, the court held that the
HeinOnline  -- 18 Mich. L. Rev. 316 1919-1920
NOTE AND COMMENT
defendant was liable, on the ground that "A manufacturer or dealer who puts
human food upon the market for sale or for immediate consumption does
so upon an implied representation that it is wholesome for human consump-
tion. Practically he must know it is fit or take the consequences." In Jack-
son v. Coca Cola Co., (Miss.) 64 So. 791, one who was a bottler of soft
drinks was held liable for injury to one who drank thereof, although there
was no contract between him and the plaintiff and although no evidence 
ot
his negligence was given, on the ground that he was "under a legal duty"
to see that no one was injured by foreign substances in his product.
An even more obvious type of extraneously imposed liability is found 
in
those cases where the liability was founded originally on free will-that 
is
to say, where a seller is held liable-as a "warrantor." The original basis 
of
this liability seems to have been that of misrepresentation and deceit. AmZs,
HisToRY or AssuMPsIT. 2 HARv. LAW Rtv. 8. It has long been treated, 
how-
ever, as a contractual liability. In this theory, at first, the element oi 
intent
on the seller's part to assume a liability was considered essential. In 
some
cases it is held that the intent must expressly appear, as by use of the 
word
"warrant." Chandler v. Lopus, Cro. Jac. 4, discussed by Mr. Ames, 2 HAXv.
LAW Rzv. 9; De Sewhenberg v. Buchanan, 5 Car. & P. 343. In others 
it is
held that it must at least be clearly implied in fact. Borrekin v. Bevan, 
3"
Rawle (Pa.) 23; Henson v. King, 3 Jones (N. C.) 419; Coats v. Hord,
x.5 Pac. 40. But at present the tendency is to ignore all thought 
of real
intention on the seller's part and to "imply" a liability as a matter 
of law
from the mere act of sale. Thus, in Chapman v. Roggenkamp, 182 Ill. 
App.
117, the defendant had sold a can of peas to plaintiff. There was some 
sort
of toxin in the peas and the buyer was made violently sick. He -sued the
seller in damages on the theory of an implied warranty. The sale was the
ordinary grocery store transaction and there was nothing to indicate inten-
tional or conscious assumptior of liability of any sort by the seller. Further-
more, he had not himself canned the peas, but had bought them from a well
reputed packing house. He had no more knowledge of the contents of the
can than the buyer, the plaintiff, had, and could not in any sense have been
said to be at fault. Yet, despite this absence of either intent to assume
a liability, or fault of any sort. on the defendant's part. he was held liable
in damages. The same result was reached in Ward v. Great Atlantic and
Pacic Tea Co., 23t Mass. go, where the defendant, a grocer, sold, in the usual
way, a can of beans which he had bought from a well known wholesaler
who used all modem and proper methods in the packing process. The defend-
ant was wholly without actual fault, and, of course, without knowledge of
anything wrong with the beans. The buyer broke a tooth on a stone that
was with the beans and was allowed to recover damages from the seller. The
decision was based upon a section of the Sales Act, but the court expressly
said that the section was but a codification of the Common Law. See also,
Sloan v. F. W. Woolworth Co.. 103 Ill. App. 62o. In the most recent decision,
Carnavan v. City of Mechanicsville, 177 N. Y. S. 8o8. decided coincidently
with the statement of Mr. Justice McKenna quoted above, this absolute liabil-
ity. as. a matter of law, rather than of real intention, was extended to those
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who sell water for household purposes. The defendant was held liable, on
an implied warranty of wholesomeness, regardless of any negligence on its
part, because the plaintiff had contracted typhoid fever from the water which
its municipal waterworks had furnished.
The reason given for these holdings bases them squarely, not on zny real
assumption of liability, but on a liability imposed by law as a matter of public
policy. In Jackson v. Watson & Sons, [I9o91 2 K. B. i03, it was said by
Vaughn Williams, L. J., that the cause of action, whether in form of tort or
of contract arose out of a duty following the relation of the parties.
Should Mr. Justice McKenna ever desire to withdraw from his position
in the Arizona Copper Co. case, without the appearance of having reversed
himself, he might say boldly, on the precedent of Parks v. Yost Pie Co.,
"Practically, an employer must know his employment is safe. or take the
consequences." Or he might say, more euphemistically but none the less
legitimately, "In every contract of employment there is, if public policy so
requires, an implied warranty that the work is safe." J. B. W.
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